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amended Appropriations Act, General Assembly Resolutions 45 and Governors Addresses, 4 6 the Pupil Placement Act was unconstitutional. The
court said the pattern was plain-that the legislature had adopted procedures to defeat the Brown decision. As regards the alleged administrative remedy the court said that before persons would be barred from
federal courts as not having exhausted the administrative remedy, the
administrative remedy must be adequate-that it must be indeed a remedy
and not an administrative block. They then determined the administrative
remedy in this case to be, in fact, a block.
By way of conclusion it can be said that so far the federal courts have
been very decisive in striking down legislative and other attempts to defeat
the Brown decision. Some states will undoubtedly continue to endeavor
to postpone integration by the exercise of every means at their disposal,
including the enactment of statutes. In light of the present unsympathetic
attitude of the federal courts toward such legislative proposals it would
seem that states by passing such laws can hope to accomplish no more than
a delaying of the inevitable. Even the element of delay has been seriously
curtailed by the holding in the Adkins case 47 requiring the administrative
remedy be "adequate" before the complainant is bound to exhaust it as a
prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.
SAMUEL A. ANDERSON
LEGAL INVESTMENTS FOR A WYOMING TRUSTEE
The use of trusts is presently accelerating with such force that trustees
currently control an estimated 85 billion dollars.' This is sufficient to
indicate that the use of trusts is becoming so prevalent that it may be
considered to be the rule rather than the exception. This article will
scrutinize the laws which control the Wyoming trustee's selection of investments as he fulfills his duty of making the trust funds properly productive.
The first thing the Wyoming trustee must use as a guidepost for his
selection of investments is the Wyoming Constitution. This provides as
follows:
No act of the legislature shall authorize the investment of
trust funds by executors, administrators, guardians,
or trustees,
2
in the bonds or stock of any private corporation.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has interpreted this constitutional provision as prohibiting the passage of such an act by the legislature as well
as being a specific declaration of policy against a trustee making such an'
investment without court approval. The Court said:
45.
46.
47.

Va. Acts 1956, Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, p. 1213 (Interposition Resolution).
Adkins v. School Board of Newport News, 148 F.Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957).
Ibid.
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Report of the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Charitable and Philanthropic Agencies and Organizations 15 (1954).
Wyo. Const., Art. III, § 38.
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By prohibiting the enactment of such a statute, as our constitution does, it acts as a specific restraint upon him (the trustee)
in making investments, and he cannot, as alreay stated, make those
in the constitution unless the court authorizes that to
mentioned
3
be done.
Thus in Wyoming, by constitutional provision, a trustee is restrained from
investing in the bonds or stocks of any private corporation unless he first
obtains court approval.
The Wyoming court has not been alone in reaching the above conclusion. The Supreme Court of Alabama construed their constitutional
provision relating to trust fund investments, which is identical to that of
Wyoming, and reached nearly the same result. The Alabama court said
that their constitution established a policy that a fiduciary should not
invest in the bonds and stocks of a private corporation. The Alabama
court did not say that a trustee could invest outside the permitted investments with court approval, but the court did say that it was proper for an
Alabama trustee to loan money and take the bonds or stocks of a private
4
corporation as security for the loan.
Together with the constitution and court decisions of this state, a
Wyoming trustee must also look to the statutes of Wyoming for guidance
in his selection of investments. A Wyoming statute positively states that
nothing shall limit the authority to invest which is granted by a trust
instrument to a named trustee.5 The Wyoming trustee has the power to
invest in corporate stocks if the settlor has expressly given him this power
in the trust instrument.
Some other statutes which bear on this problem comprise the Wyoming
"legal list" of permitted investments. 6 It can readily be seen from an
examination of Wyoming's legal list that generally speaking, the only
permissible investments are in bonds and mortgages. This is not completely
desirable, as is indicated by the many objections to trust fund statutes
7
which restrict investments to bonds and mortgages.
The main objection raised against a legal list such as Wyoming's is
that during an inflationary period an investment in bonds is not a worthwhile investment as the profits reaped by the investments are destroyed by
inflation. 8 This results in a loss to the beneficiary in terms of actual purchasing power. A good illustration of this point is made by comparing
the purchasing value of $75 invested in a Government Series "E" Savings
Bond in 1945 against the purchasing value of the $100 which the bond
would have yielded in 1955.
3. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Durrin, 61 Wyo. 1, 154 P.2d 348 (1944).
4. Sims v. Russel, 236 Ala. 562, 183 So. 862 (1938).
5. Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 8-302 (1945).
6. Wyo. Comp. Stat. §§ 8-301, 8-304 and 35-1102 (1945).
7. Whyte, Should the Prudent Man Rule for Trust Investment be Adopted in
Wisconsin?, 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 499; Note, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 341 (1951).
8. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Brown, 177 Misc. 136, 30 N.Y.S.2d 85

(1941).
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The permitted investments in Wyoming provide nothing as a defense
against the ravages of inflation. Since 1941, the United States has been in
a period of general inflation. As the purpose of any trust is to see that the
beneficiary is adequately provided for, the Wyoming trustee is confronted
with the problem of trying to maintain the beneficiary's standard of living
by not limiting the beneficiary to a fixed income, as such an income will
slowly be reduced in value by inflation.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that under such conditions as the United States has experienced during the last sixteen years,
an investment may be more prudent if it is in corporate stocks rather than
in the investments permitted by Wyoming's legal list.9 It is also well
recognized that corporate stocks are a worthwhile investment from the
standpoint of dividends. Scores of common stocks are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange which have paid regular dividends for periods of
time ranging from 50 to 90 consecutive years. 1° The view that corporate
stocks were inherently a proper form of investment under modern conditions has been taken by a divided court under a will which relieved the
trustee from the restrictions of the legal list.11
A trustee could fulfill his obligation to both the beneficiary and the
settlor if he were permitted to invest a certain percentage of the trust funds
in corporate stocks and securities of a s6und nature. The reason for this
is that shares of stock are more likely to increase in value where there is a
currency or credit inflation and the dividends are also likely to increase so
the return will more nearly represent the same purchasing power the settlor
originally intended for the beneficiary. 1 2 If a part of the trust funds have
been invested in corporate stocks, the chances are less likely that the beneficiary's income will remain stationary.
Another objection to the Wyoming investment law results from the
requirement imposed upon a trustee to diversify the investments. A
reasonably prudent trustee will diversify the investment and spread the
trust assets over a number of types of securities.' 3 This acts as a hedge
against many. things, but primarily against fluctuation in general business
conditions. The only practical diversification permitted by Wyoming law
is that part of the trust funds may be invested in bonds of one city or state
and another part in the bonds of' the federal government. This defeats
the goal for which a skilled investor should aim. A skilled investor will
have a certain percentage in various bonds and stocks and a percentage in
banks and savings and loan associations. This protects the funds and still
yields a realistic income. This line of investment is unfortunately unavailable to a Wyoming trustee.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Supra note 3.
Dividends Over the Years, Published by Members of the New York Stock Exchange
(1957).
In re Carwithen's Estate, 28 Pa.D.&C. 66, reversed on other grounds, 327 Pa. 480,
194 Atl. 743 (1937).
Supra note 7.
City of Boston v. Curley, 276 Mass. 549, 177 N.E. 557 (1931).
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Another objection which may be interposed to the Wyoming investment law results from the fact that court approval is required before a
trustee may safely invest outside the legal list. 1 4 This decision assumes a
great deal of the courts in Wyoming. By substituting judicial judgment
for the judgment of a trustee, the assumption is that a court will know
more about what is or what is not a sound investment than a trustee who
has been appointed to the trusteeship because of his long and successful
experience in the field of managing either his own or someone else's investments. It is possible that as the courts in Wyoming have been relegated
to the position of investment counselors, they will be swamped by petitions
asking for permission to invest outside the permitted securities. The
probable result of this would be that courts would not be likely to entertain such actions and would make this fact known by denying permission
to those seeking such relief.
The settlor is the one person who can make sure that the trustee will
not be bound within the narrow confines of permissible investment as
defined by Wyoming law. The trustee will have the power to invest in
corporate stocks if the settlor expressly gives him this power in the trust
instrument. 15 The law is definite that the settlor of a trust may legally
designate the kind and character of investments which are to be made by
the trustee. If this method of conferring investment powers upon the
trustees is to be used, the draftsman of the trust instrument should take
note that the intention of the settlor to confer upon the trustee this power
must be spelled out with the utmost clarity in the instrument. If there is any
doubt of this intention, courts will favor the construction that the settlor
did not mean to confer such powers.' 6 If the settlor does not confer broad
powers, he may set up his own "legal list." If this is done, the trustee is
bound to follow this list just as he would the state's list. It is not likely
that this list may be changed in any respect. The Wyoming Supreme
Court has said that where a will expressly limits the investment of funds to
certain securities, it is not within the power of the court to change the
terms of the trust in that particular by approving unauthorized investments.' 7 The settlor's express commands may even exclude the legal list
as a guide to proper investments if the instrument is so drafted.
As previously mentioned, a Wyoming trustee may invest in corporate
stock if he first petitions the court to allow outside investments.18 Before
the court will permit this, the trustee will have to show the necessity of the
desired outside investment. 19 The Wyoming Supreme Court also indicated
that the court should be extremely careful in permitting outside investments and when such an investment is permitted, it should only be in
20
shares of a company which has long been proven to be sound.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Supra note 3.
Supra note 5.
Annot., 99 A.L.R. 910 (1935).
International Trust Co. v. Preston, 24 Wyo. 163, 156 Pac. 1128 (1916).
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Durrin, 61 Wyo. 1, 154 P.2d 348 (1944).
Ibid.
Ibid.
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A problem which is related to the propriety of certain investments
exists because courts have indicated that there is a real question whether
the rules governing investments by trustees are applicable to charitable
corporations. 2 1 This question has not been settled in Wyoming.
A good argument may be made to support the contention that a
charitable corporation shall not be bound by the investment laws which
are applicable to a regular trust. It may be argued that a charitable
corporation is not within the policy declaration of the Wyoming Constitution as a charitable corporation is not an "executor, administrator, guardian,
or trustee" 22 and this is evidenced by the fact that the Wyoming statutes
give a charitable corporation the power to raise money in any manner
which is specified by its articles of association or its by-laws. 23 Furthermore,
as a settlor has the express power to name what is a permitted investment
in the trust instrument, 24 he has the power to incorporate by reference the
articles or by-laws of the charitable corporation as a part of the trust
instrument. 25 Thus, the settlor may give the corporation the power to
invest as the charitable corporation's articles or by-laws specify. This
would be the same as if the power was expressly given by the trust instrument itself.
On the other hand, a good argument may be made to support the
contention that a charitable corporation will be bound by the investment
laws of Wyoming which are applicable to a regular trustee. It may be
argued that a charitable corporation is technically within the policy
declaration expressed by the Wyoming Constitution as this provision
applies to "executors, administrators, guardians, and trustees." 26 Support
for this proposition comes from many courts which hold a charitable corporation to be a trustee, since such a corporation holds property for the
general benefit of others.27 The Wyoming Supreme Court has equated a
charitable corporation with a trustee in a case which involved the conveyance of real property by a charitable corporation. 28 The legal list
statute of Wyoming apparently includes a charitable corporation in the
definition of who is bound to follow the requirements of this statute. This
29
statute is applicable to "every individual, bank or trust company."
Courts have, in nearly all cases, held that the word "individual" as used
in most statutes does encompass a corporation.8 0 There appears to be no
valid argument against this construction unless it would be that the word
"corporation" does not include a charitable corporation.
21.

Town of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass'n., 64 Wyo. 648, 196 P.2d 369 (1948).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Wyo. Const., Art. III, § 38.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 44-1005 (1945).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 8-302 (1945).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 6-2902 (1945).
Supra note 21.
E.g., Wellessly College v. Attorney General, 313 Mass. 722, 725, 49 N.E.2d 220, 222

28.
29.

Town of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass'n., 64 Wyo. 648, 196 P.2d 369 (1948).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 8-301 (1945).

30.

(1943).

In re United Button Co., 137 Fed. 668, (D.Del. 1904); Georgetown College v. Webb,
313 Ky. 25, 230 S.W.2d 84 (1950).

NOTES

There have been no decisions in Wyoming or any other state
would resolve the question presented by the foregoing arguments,
Bogert and Scott in their respective works in the field of trusts feel
charitable corporation should not be bound by the investment laws
are applicable to regular trusts.8 1

which
Both
that a
which

A trustee in Wyoming, without the power to invest outside the legal
list of permitted securities, is not in an enviable position. Should he find
himself in this situation, the only safe course for him to follow is to invest
prudently in the permitted securities. This may result in the beneficiary's
purchasing power slowly declining while the economy of this country is
slowly ascending.
Setting aside the private trust, the problem is most acute as to existing
charitable institutions which have received and will continue to receive
gifts. Quite frequently the gifts are in a will and in the form
of outright gifts with no express trust terms stated. Although it is in the
form of an outright gift, courts may apply trust restrictions because of a
policy decision that charitable corporations should be treated as trusts, as
heretofore indicated, or the court may consider it as a gift in trust with
the institution being the trustee subject to adherance to the legal list. The
hardship on these institutions is that whereas a charitable institution may
be currently receiving two per cent on its investments, it could double
the amount of money available for the furtherance of its charitable purposes, without endangering the safety of the corpus, if the Wyoming
investment laws would permit investments which would yield a more
realistic rate. Because of this and the many problems previously mentioned, a change in the investment laws of Wyoming would seem to be
indicated.
Remedial legislation is not the answer in Wyoming as this would be
prohibited by the Wyoming Constitution. The answer is to be found
in the Constitution itself.
A constitutional provision such as Wyoming's is relatively rare. The
constitutions of five states, including Pennsylvania and Wyoming, did have
such a provision.3 2 Pennsylvania revised this section of its constitution in
1933. Its constitution no longer limits the investment of trust funds in
any manner. Wyoming should follow the lead of Pennsylvania in modernizing its investment laws by modernizing its constitution. The Wyoming
legislature would then be free to adopt modern legislation. A majority
of states has adopted the prudent-investor rule which gives the trustee the
31.
32.

4 Scott on Trusts, § 389 (2d ed. 1956); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 399 (1951).
Const. of Ala., Art. IV, § 74.
Const. of Colo., Art. V, § 36.
Const. of Mont., Art. V, § 37.
Const. of Pa., Art. III, § 22, amended Nov. 7, 1933, to read as follows:
The General Assembly may, from time to time, by law, prescribe the nature
and kind of investment for trust funds to be made by executors, administrators,
trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries.
Const. of Wyo., Art III, § 38.
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right to make any investments; he will only be liable for the losses which
were occasioned by investments which would not, at the time of the investment, have been made by a prudent investor, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to the permanent disposition of the funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital.38
The fallacy of the present investment laws in Wyoming may best be
summarized by the following statement. There is no man or group of men
presently alive who can be certain, at any point in human history, which
investment is likely to be sound and which unsound; or which investment
will continue to produce reasonable income and which not; therefore, any
attempt to freeze an authorized list of investments is doomed to disappointment.
WADE BRoRBY

THE CONCEPT OF GOOD FAITH BARGAINING UNDER
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947
The National Labor Relations Act of 1947, more commonly referred
to as the Taft-Hartley Act, describes unfair labor practices of both employers and labor organizations in Section 8. After setting out activities
that constitute such practices the following provision outlines the statutory
duty to bargain collectively:
...to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonabfe times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession ....

I

The primary objective of our national labor policy is to promote
industrial peace by encouraging the practice of collective bargaining. This
objective was first developed under the original National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 and it continues in the 1947 amendment to the Act. To best
describe this theory of successful labor-management negotiation, -it is
appropriate that we examine the legal requirements of bargaining collectively. A more thorough examination can be achieved by first giving
content to the phrase, "to .

.

. confer in good faith."

DUTY TO COLLECTIVELY BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH
If collective bargaining were to aid in resolving industrial strife and
eliminating costly strikes, some requirement of good faith was necessary.
HISTORY OF THE

33.
1.

Harvard College v. Armory, 9 Pick, 446 (Mass. 1830).
Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, § 8 (d), 61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952 ed.).

